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NOTES
DuTY-RISK IN THE LOWER COURTS: FLEXIBILITY OR RIGIDITY?
The taxicab in which the plaintiff Shaw was riding negligently
collided with a number of vehicles parked on the shoulder of the road
at the scene where Wall, a minor, had a short time before negligently
overturned the automobile he was driving. Wall had failed to display
flares or otherwise to warn approaching cars of the blocked highway
and was in a police car being questioned at the time of the collision.
In an action by Shaw against Wall's mother and her insurer for dam-
ages resulting from the crash, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal,
relying on duty-risk analysis, held that Wall's negligence was a cause-
in-fact of the accident and that the intervening negligence of the
taxidriver did not relieve the defendants of liability. Shaw v. The
Travelers Insurance Co., 293 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writs
refused, 295 So. 2d 815 (La. 1974).
Louisiana courts have long recognized that the intervening negli-
gence of a third party may suffice to exonerate an original wrongdoer
from liability.' In the past, courts employed the vocabulary of "proxi-
mate causation" and its derivative "passive negligence" to deny re-
covery against the original wrongdoer.2 The negligent conduct of a
defendant who created a potentially dangerous situation was consid-
ered "passive" and too remote to be a contributing cause of plaintiff's
harm when a third party's subsequent negligent act combined with
the dangerous situation to cause the damage.' Thus, the courts de-
clared that the "sole and proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injuries
was the intervening misconduct of the third party.' By emphasizing
the "chronology of the negligent acts,"' the doctrine of passive negli-
1. See, e.g., Manning v. Fortenberry Drilling Co., 107 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1958); Thiaville v. Toups, 25 So. 2d 361 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946). Cf. Jackson v. Jones,
224 La. 403, 69 So. 2d 729 (1953).
2. See, e.g., Dixie Drive It Yourself System, Inc. v. AmericanBeverage Co., 128
So. 2d 841 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Penton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 So. 2d 547 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1941).
3. Louisiana courts routinely used the term "passive negligence" to assert that the
defendant's conduct "had come to rest," or "had become passive," thus relieving
defendant of liability since his conduct was not considered a proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injury. Manning v. Fortenberry Drilling Co., 107 So. 2d 713, 717 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1958); Penton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 So. 2d 547, 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
4. See, e.g., Williams v. Pelican Creamer, Inc., 30 So. 2d 574, 577 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1947); Bourgeois v. Longman, 199 So. 142, 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
5. See Dixie Drive It Yourself System, Inc. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
496, 137 So. 2d 298, 307 (1962): "The doctrine of passive negligence ... places undue
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gence within the proximate cause setting was viewed by the courts
as a rule of law that invariably relieved all but the last wrongdoer of
liability to an injured party.6
The Louisiana supreme court disavowed the passive negligence
approach, however, in Dixie Drive It Yourself System, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Beverage Co.,7 which marked the beginning in Louisiana tort law
of a more straightforward, policy-oriented approach to resolving the
problem of liability in multi-cause cases.8 In Dixie, defendant's em-
ployee failed to display signal flags, as required by statute, when the
vehicle he was driving became disabled on the traveled portion of the
highway. The driver of an approaching truck, an employee of the
lessee of the truck negligently failed to observe the stalled vehicle and
a collision resulted. In allowing recovery in a suit by the owner for
damages to his truck, the court held that the issue of defendant's
liability hinged upon "whether the risk and harm encountered by the
emphasis on the chronology of the negligent acts and omissions. In so doing it insulates
the first wrongdoer from liability to innocent victims." It necessarily followed that
whenever the court concluded defendant's original conduct was too remote or passive,
his liability ceased. See Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself versus Ameri-
can Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363, 368 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rumi-
nations]: "Whenever an intervening act of negligence on the part of a third party is
discoverable, it necessarily follows that the defendant's earlier wrongdoing must be
regarded as having become passive. This is inescapable because if the original wrong-
doer were still in action, his misconduct and that of the third party must necessarily
be regarded as concurrent, and there would be no intervening wrong. Hence the active-
passive distinction adds nothing to the discussion."
6. See Robertson, Reason versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill
v. Lundin and Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Dialogues].
7. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
8. See Dialogues at 20; Ruminations at 364. For a survey of later decisions affirm-
ing the Dixie abandonment of the doctrine of passive negligence see Woods v. Employ-
ers Liab. Assurance Corp., 172 So. 2d 100, 111 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965): "Though one's
negligence may be passive and have come to rest, it nevertheless subjects one to
liability for all resulting injury within the protective scope of the duty or burden of
care that has been violated, when the subsequent negligence of another in combination
therewith produces injury to an innocent third party." See also Steagall v. Houston
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 So. 2d 433, 436 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962): "The concept of
passive negligence is not recognized in Louisiana Law to defeat the claim of an inno-
cent tort victim." Accord, Newton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1968); Champagne v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 170 So. 2d 226 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964); Bertrand v. Trunkline Gas Co., 149 So. 2d 152, 154 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963). It is interesting to note that in a number of cases lower courts have failed
to heed the admonition in Dixie against employing the "passive negligence" approach.
See Monger v. McFarlain, 204 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Hartzog v. Eubanks,
200 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Surry v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 170 So.
2d 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 247 La. 358, 171 So. 2d 477 (1965).
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plaintiff [fell] within the scope of the protection of the statute"
violated by the defendant? Specifically, the court reasoned that the
statutory duty requiring a disabled vehicle to display signal flags was
designed to protect against the risk that an oncoming motorist,
whether cautious or inattentive, would fail to perceive the vehicle in
time to avoid a collision.'0 The court further intimated that the issue
of defendant's liability depends, in part, upon a policy inquiry which
must be undertaken under the facts of each case without recourse to
automatic doctrines like passive negligence."
In Pierre v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Louisiana supreme court
again indicated its preference for a policy-oriented approach and
applied the Dixie analysis to the facts before it. Defendant's insured
had parked his Chrysler, unattended and partially blocking traffic,
on a narrow road in violation of a statute. Because the Chrysler was
blocking its right lane, the pickup truck in which plaintiffs' father
was riding was forced to halt behind the Chrysler to wait until the
oncoming traffic had passed. An inattentively operated dump truck
then crashed into the back of the stopped pickup, killing plaintiffs'
father. Although Pierre involved a different statutory restriction than
that violated in Dixie,3 the court again found that one of the risks
sought to be avoided by imposing the statutory duty not to partially
block the highway was that an inattentive driver might fail to observe
a motorist stopped behind the obstructing vehicle in time to avoid an
accident."
Thus, under the court's analysis, where a statutory duty is im-
posed to protect against the risk incurred, the mere fact that there is
a later, "intervening negligent actor who helped to create the
particular risk involved will not absolve the first negligent actor from
responsibility."' 5 However, the court in Pierre was careful to note that
the Dixie decision did not hold that the original wrongdoer may never
be relieved of liability when an intervening negligent act occurs, but
only that the passive negligence theory should not be used invariably
to relieve all but the last wrongdoer from liability.'"
9. Dixie Drive It Yourself System, Inc. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
488, 137 So. 2d 298, 304 (1962).
10. Id. at 492, 137 So. 2d at 306.
11. Id. at 488, 137 So. 2d at 304.
12. 257 La. 471, 242 So. 2d 821 (1970).
13. Dixie was concerned with a violation of LA. R.S. 32:442 (1942) (using red flags
for stopped vehicle); Pierre centered upon a violation of LA. R.S. 32:141 (1950) (prohib-
iting stopping on traveled portion of the road).
14. 257 La. at 498, 242 So. 2d at 831.




The more recent case of Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co.," al-
though not concerned with the question of intervening negligence,
suggests the flexibility of the duty-risk formulation. In Laird, the
Louisiana supreme court, in rejecting defendant's claim of contri-
butory negligence, held that the risk that a careless driver, totally
oblivious to the conditions ahead, would collide with the plaintiff's
stopped vehicle, a pickup truck that protruded slightly into the road,
was not within the protective ambit of the statute requiring the plain-
tiff to park his vehicle so as not to encroach upon the lane of travel. 8
Although it held that the plaintiff Laird violated the statutory provi-
sion by stopping on the traveled portion of the highway when it was
practicable to stop off the highway, the court found that the duty
imposed upon the plaintiff by the statute was not intended to protect
against the risk that an accident would occur under the circumstan-
ces that actually materialized."
Several specific facts influenced the Laird court in its analysis.
There was no approaching or closely following traffic impeding pas-
sage on the part of the highway not occupied by Laird's vehicle,
which took up, at most, two and three-fourths feet of the twenty-foot
paved portion of the highway; thus, the driver of defendant's vehicle
could have passed the pickup truck without moving out of the usual
lane of travel.2" Moreover, Laird's brake lights were on and his vehicle
was visible for at least two tenths of a mile.' A person standing by
the stopped truck tried unsuccessfully to warn the approaching driver
to avoid the parked vehicle and there were also highway construction
signs in the area which should have alerted the driver to the possibil-
ity of danger ahead." Consequently, although the court noted that
under different circumstances Laird could have been held contributo-
rily negligent, he was not negligent under the facts presented "be-
cause there was no breach of a duty on his part which gave rise to
the harm occasioned."23 Thus, Laird illustrates that the duty-risk
formulation is not narrow and rigid in application but, as intimated
in Pierre, may be used to deny as well as sustain liability of a person
who breaches a statutory obligation."
17. 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972).
18. Id. at 215, 267 So. 2d at 720.
19. Id. at 215-16, 267 So. 2d at 720.
20. Id. at 213, 267 So. 2d at 719.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 213-14, 267 So. 2d at 719.
23. Id. at 216, 267 So. 2d at 720.
24. Perhaps the different results reached by the court in Laird and Pierre may be
explained by the fact that Laird involved the question of contributory negligence on
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The decision in the instant case casts doubt upon the implemen-
tation of the duty-risk approach by lower courts. It appears from the
majority opinion that the court viewed the facts before it as generally
analogous to those in Pierre, and applied that holding without consid-
ering the particular circumstances surrounding the injury incurred by
Shaw. Moreover, the court seemed to imply that liability is contin-
gent only upon a finding that the breach of a duty is a cause-in-fact
of the damage incurred by the plaintiff. The court stated:
The exact situation presented in Pierre v. Allstate Insurance
Company . . .exists in this case. In fact, the situation presented
here creates an even stronger factual situation for finding that
Wall's negligence was a cause-in-fact of the accident . . . .It is
difficult to see how the trial court erred in applying Pierre...
to the case at bar."
In deciding whether to impose liability upon a negligent defen-
dant, the supreme court has made clear that duty-risk analysis, pro-
perly employed, requires that the courts, in addition to finding that
defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the accident, 6 must make
an individualized determination of whether the defendant owed a
legal duty to the plaintiff to guard against the particular risk in-
curred, under all the facts presented." Neither the trial court nor the
court of appeal in the instant case specified what statutory duty had
been breached by Wall or whether that duty encompassed the risk of
Shaw's injury. Further, a court's duty-risk determination should in-
volve, in part, a consideration of certain "legal or policy" factors
"which grant excuses from certain consequences which follow an orig-
the part of an original wrongdoer. The absence of a comparative negligence doctrine
in Louisiana might have made the court reluctant to find plaintiff negligent and hence
totally bar his recovery. Whatever reason might be behind the different results, Laird
does illustrate the court's effort to infuse flexibility into the duty-risk formulation.
25. Shaw v. Travelers Ins. Co., 293 So. 2d 568, 572 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
26. Properly viewed, cause-in-fact is purely a straightforward factual inquiry,
involving little resort to factors of policy or justice. If the harm suffered by the plaintiff
would not have occurred "but for" the conduct of the defendant, defendant's conduct
is deemed a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs harm. For a survey of cases confusing the issue
of causation with the ultimate determination of liability see Brantley v. Brown, 277
So. 2d 141 (La. 1973); Johnson v. Johnson, 171 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
For a general discussion of cause-in-fact, see Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,
9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-
1966 Term-Torts, 26 LA. L. REV. 510, 518 (1966). See also Dialogues at 20-21 n.47.
27. The court in Pierre stated that one of the keys for the solution of the issue of
responsibility when there is more than one cause-in-fact of damages is "a determina-
tion of the exact risk or risks anticipated by the imposition of the legal duty which has
been breached .... " 257 La. at 499, 242 So. 2d at 831.
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inal act of negligence.""8 If this analytical technique had been pro-
perly applied in Shaw, it is at least questionable whether defendant
would have been required to respond in damages.
In pointing out that the majority had failed to correctly apply the
duty-risk approach, Judge Frug6, in dissent, indicated which circum-
stances he felt might bear on the defendant's ultimate liability but
which had not been considered. 9 For instance, the highway, which
was rather wide, was not obstructed completely and the cars which
had stopped were on the shoulder of the highway.'" The area was well
illuminated from the headlights of the parked vehicles, whose emer-
gency flashers and turn signals were engaged to warn approaching
traffic.' Justice Barham, in his dissent from the supreme court's
denial of writs in the case, indicated another fact which he felt
should have been decisive in the case: the defendant had been
arrested or otherwise detained by the police and thus was unable to
take precautionary measures to prevent the accidents that occurred.2
Whether or not these factors would have changed the result in Shaw,
the court should have at least considered whether they caused the
28. Id. See Dialogues at 17-19 n.38: "The operative limitation Dixie stresses is the
policy inquiry into the coverage of the duty." Correctly applying the Dixie approach,
the court in Todd v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 219 So. 2d 538, 540 n.3 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969) quoting from W. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS § 49 at 282-83 (3d ed. 1964) stated:
"Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact been one of the causes
of the plaintiff's injury, there remains the question whether the defendant should be
legally responsible for what he has caused. Unlike the fact of causation, with which it
is often hopelessly confused, this is essentially a problem of law. It is sometimes said
to be a question of whether the conduct has been so significant and important a cause
that the defendant should be legally responsible. But both significance and importance
turn upon conclusions in terms of legal policy, so that this becomes essentially a
question of whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct
to the consequences which have in fact occurred." For a discussion of policy as a guide
in determining liability see Dialogues at 12; Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1034 (1928); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,
9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956). See also Lynch v. Fisher, 41 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1949).
The courts have recognized that violation of statutes under certain circumstances
may be excusable in civil cases. See Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So.
2d 714 (1972); Rowe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 La. 659, 219 So. 2d 486 (1969); Jackson
v. Beechwood, Inc., 180 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965); Moses v. Mosley, 146 So.
2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). See also Ruminations at 386-87.
29. "The facts found in the opinion rendered by this court are contrary to the
written findings of the trial court. The misconstruction of the facts has contributed to
the misapplication of the law." 293 So. 2d at 573.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Shaw v. Travelers Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 815 (La. 1974) (Barham, J., dissenting
from denial of writs).
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risk encountered by the plaintiff to be beyond the duty imposed on
the defendant.
More importantly, the instant decision demonstrates a tendency
by the lower courts to extract from Dixie and Pierre a "rule" out of
what was originally meant to be an approach or technique.33 Prior to
the introduction of the duty-risk approach, courts had, by applying
the "passive negligence" doctrine as a rule, generally relieved the
original wrongdoer from liability." Disapproval of the "passive negli-
gence" rule was not intended to establish a converse rule sustaining
a finding of liability against the original wrongdoer regardless of the
nature of the subsequent misconduct of a third party." Nevertheless,
in applying the holding in Pierre to the factual situation before it, the
court in the present case appears to have substituted a rule automati-
cally sustaining the liability of the original wrongdoer for one auto-
matically rejecting liability. Duty-risk should be viewed as a
method of analysis that leaves the courts free to consider the acts of
misconduct in the context of the facts and circumstances of each
controversy and to confer immunity upon the original wrongdoer
where policy so dictates. The current confusion exemplified by Shaw
suggests a need by the lower courts to pause and take note of the true
nature of the duty-risk approach so that the effort of the supreme
court to infuse flexibility into Louisiana tort law will not be frus-
trated.
Sylvia R. Cooks
LEGAL EXPENSES AND THE ORIGIN TEST
Taxpayers, sole shareholders of a corporation, received the cor-
33. See Addison v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 805, 812 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973);
Phillips v. Ursin, 280 So. 2d 243, 249 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Craig v. Burch, 228 So.
2d 723, 729 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Pico v. Allstate Ins. Co., 206 So. 2d 99, 101 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968).
34. See cases cited at note 2, supra.
35. Ruminations at 393.
36. Referring to Pierre, Professor Robertson observed: "What the case amounts
to is a clear and almost fully explicit admonition that rules are not magic; that each
case must be approached, within a fabric of principle and doctrine, on its own facts.
It seems evident that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has been trending rather
strongly in recent years toward a fairly consistent position that the Louisiana tort law
should seek to avoid the proliferation of doctrines of narrow and rigid thrust, in favor
of more straightforward, conscious, and fact-oriented resort to the underlying princi-
ples of the Louisiana Civil Code." Dialogues at 24-25. See also Ruminations at 369.
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